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Abstract
This paper analyses the e¤ects of public funding of higher education on
the welfare of the di¤erent agents. It takes into account the hierarchical
nature of the educational system and also the fact that parents always
have the possibility to complement basic public education with private
expenditures in individual tutoring.
It is obtained that although public funding implies a larger access to
higher education it is always the case that some of the agents that gain
access lose in welfare terms. Moreover, it is shown that the marginal agent
to access university would always prefer a pure private funding system.
Thus, when studying the e¤ects of public funding of higher education, we
can not identify gaining access to University with an increase in welfare.
Finally, I consider a funding system where only those that send their
o¤spring to university support the funding of higher education.
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1 Introduction
For OECD countries the average value for public expenditure on higher educa-
tion as a percentage of GDP was in 2006, 1.3%, with a minimum of 0.6% for
Japan and a maximum of 2.3% for Denmark.1 Only recently the no tuition
policy followed in many European countries has been questioned and the public
funding of higher education is under debate. However, since the initial contri-
bution of Hansen and Weisbrod (1969), a consensus was built in the economic
literature that public funding of higher education implies a redistribution of
income from poor to rich people, or at least from the ends (both poor and rich)
to the middle. This is mainly a consequence of the fact that students from high
income families are more likely to attend higher education.
Barr (2004) presents data for 2002 from the UK Education and Skills Select
Committee: 81 per cent of children from professional backgrounds went to
University; the comparable gure for children from manual backgrounds was 15
per cent. For the US, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) also show that college
participation rates are much higher for high income families.2 The recent study
Eurostudent 2005, that considers several European countries, shows that in
general the percentage of studentsparents with higher education is much higher
than the corresponding percentage for the whole population.3 Thus, the large
amounts governments all around the world keep spending on higher education
seem to imply a redistribution in the wrong direction.
This paper aims to study the e¤ects of the public funding of higher education
on the welfare of the di¤erent agents, focusing on those agents whose decision
of sending or not their child to th University depends on public funding policy.4
To this end, I compare di¤erent levels of higher education subsidies taking into
account the hierarchical nature of the educational system and also the fact
that parents always have the possibility to complement public education with
private expenditures in individual tutoring. I establish the characteristics of
those agents whose welfare increases and those agents whose welfare decreases
with the public funding of higher education. I consider pure private funding,
pure public funding and a mixed system where a percentage of the University
cost is privately supported with the remaining being publicly supported. Note
that what is relevant for the results in this paper is not who is the provider
of higher education but who nances it. Public funding is nanced by income
taxes that apply to the whole population.
There are already many papers that use a Political Economy approach to
study how the public funding of higher education may be the result of the politi-
1OECD 2009. See also Greenway and Haynes (2004) for a detailed description of the data
relative to higher education.
2Su (2004) refers to several studies for the US and the UK for the 70s and 80s where this
is shown: Hansen (1970), Radner and Miller (1970), Peltzman (1973), Bishop (1977) and Le
Grand (1982).
3The only exception is Ireland. This study collects several indicators that describe the
social and economic conditions of higher education students in Europe. Unfortunately there
is almost no data on parentsincome.
4To simplify the exposition I dont distinguish between higher education and university.
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cal process. Important examples are Creedy and François (1990) and Fernández
and Rogerson (1995). Here, however, I follow the Gloom and Ravikumar (2003)
approach, who take policy as given and look at its implications.
De Fraja (2002) gives a complete theoretical characterization of the most
e¢ cient funding of higher education. However, he is not worried with the ques-
tions asked in this paper relative to access and welfare. Closer to the questions
addressed in this paper, Caucutt and Kumar (2003) study the e¤ects of in-
creasing higher education subsidies on inequality, welfare and e¢ ciency. They
solve their model numerically for the US case and obtain that, when present,
the aggregate welfare gain is minimal. They also calculate the welfare gain for
the two types of agents present in their model: poor (school educated) and rich
(college educated). In any of the policy alternatives studied the rich lose and
the poor gain. This would indicate that subsidizing higher education benets
the poor, implying a redistribution in the right direction, which goes against the
literature consensus. However, this is again an aggregate measure, in this case
for all parents of a given type, obtained as an expected gain from the policy and
without discriminating between those who send their child to college and those
who dont. In this paper, I calculate the welfare gain for each of a continuum
of di¤erent parents distinguishing between those who decide to send their child
to the University and those who decide not to send. I focus exactly on those
whose decision depends on the subsidy level. The simplicity of the model allows
to obtain general analytical results.
I take into account the hierarchical nature of the educational system. Al-
though usually absent from economic analysis, this aspect is very important for
the study of higher education as it implies that only those that attain a min-
imum level in basic education are able to go to the University.5 Thus, higher
education is never a good of universal access, even if it is free. For OECD coun-
tries in 2007, the average value of the entry rate was 56% for type-A tertiary
education and 15% for type-B tertiary education (OECD 2009). The access to
higher education is always limited and there is evidence that the main barrier
in the access to University is not the lack of nancial means but the failure to
attain the educational prerequisites required to access University.
...ample evidence from the United States suggests that true
credit constraints are not a binding issue in the admission to higher
education in the vast majority of cases (cf. Carneiro and Heck-
man 2003; Cunha et al. 2006). Rather, the fact that students from
disadvantaged family backgrounds have a much lower probability of
entering University seems to be caused by a lack of early educational
investments which deprive these students of the basic prerequisites
to advance to University. If this is true in the United States, where
5Judson (1998), Su (2004) and Blankenau (2005) are exceptions that consider the hier-
archical nature of education. However, all these papers study the allocation of public funds
across di¤erent levels of education. This is not the problem addressed here. In this paper
expenditures in basic education are taken as given and I analyze the welfare implications of
public expenditure on higher education.
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colleges and universities charge substantial private fees, then it seems
that it is even more relevant in Europe, where higher education is
mostly publicly fundedin Womann and Schutz (2006, page 24)
Carneiro and Heckman (2002) obtain that at most 8% of American youth
are subject to short-term liquidity constraints that a¤ect their post-secondary
schooling.6 According to these authors, the main justication for the income
gap in enrollment is long-term factors related to the parental environment.
For Australia, Cardak and Ryan (2009) obtain that what explains the socio-
economic gap in participation in higher education is the gap in nishing sec-
ondary education or, for those students that complete secondary education, the
dependence of the secondary education nal grade on students socio-economic
background. The secondary education nal grade determines if the student is
eligible to attend University.
These empirical ndings motivate a crucial assumption of the model pre-
sented in this paper, that there is a threshold level of human capital that must
be attained for students to be able to advance to higher education. This assump-
tion will have important implications for the comparison between the di¤erent
funding systems.
In this paper, basic education is free and of universal access but parents have
the choice to complement public basic education with private expenditures in
individual tutoring or private classes. Thus, in what refers to basic education
I follow Epple and Romano (1996) in considering that public funding may be
supplemented by private-market purchases. This private expenditure may be
used to obtain access to higher education even in a public funding environment.
Finally, a remark to say that this paper is about the funding of higher
education, the arguments developed here do not apply to the funding of research
conducted by universities. Also, I do not look at public funds spent on basic
education or at policy decisions related to the quality of basic education. I focus
on higher education taking as given the outcomes of basic education.
Section 2 presents the model, section 3 compares di¤erent funding systems
in what refers to access to higher education. Section 4 looks at welfare. Section
5 considers an alternative funding system that approximates a higher education
tax. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Each agent has one o¤spring whose education he decides taking into account her
ability. Agents are heterogeneous in what refers to the level of human capital
they receive from their parents and also to the ability with which they are born.
There are two levels of education: basic (B) and University (U). The access
to basic education is universal (and free) but only those who attain a predened
threshold are able to advance to University. So, the model takes into account
6They emphasize that their results must be due to the system of nancial aid to support
post-secondary education that is in place in the US.
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the hierarchical nature of the educational system (see for instance Su, 2004 and
Judson, 1998). In what refers to higher education I consider three alternatives:
pure private funding, pure public funding and a mixed system where part of
the cost is privately supported. Note that the distinction between public and
private higher education refers only to who pays for it.7
The utility of agent i depends on own consumption and on the level of human
capital of his o¤spring (hi+1).
ui = ln ci +  lnhi+1 ,  > 0 (1)
This follows de la Croix and Doepke (2004) and is equivalent to Gloom and
Ravikumar (1992). As usual in the literature I consider that each individual
income is given by his level of human capital.8 All decisions are made by adults.
The accumulation of human capital depends on the parents level of human
capital and on the o¤springs ability (z). I assume that ability is known at the
moment the decision is taken of advancing or not to higher education. This is
in line with de Fraja (2002), who considers that there is uncertainty on ability
but the realization is known before higher education choices are made. After
basic education, to which all children attend, the level of human capital is given
by:
hB+1 = zh
; 0 <  < 1 (2)
where I omitted the index i to simplify notation.9 The level of human capital of
the o¤spring depends on the parents level of human capital. This assumption
is usual in the literature and it is deeply founded on empirical ndings (see for
instance, Carneiro and Heckman, 2003).
If this level of human capital is higher than a predened threshold bh, then
the agent may decide to send the o¤spring into University. Otherwise, the
o¤spring does not ll the needed prerequisites to advance to University and hB ;
given in (2), is the nal level of human capital that she takes to the next period
unless, as explained below, parents invest on private tutoring. The existence
of a minimum threshold is an important assumption of the model. This is a
characteristic that distinguishes higher education from basic education.
If the o¤spring goes into University, then the level of human capital she will
have as an adult is hU , given by:
hU+1 = zh
 = hB+1;  > 1 (3)
 is the productivity parameter in higher education. It is larger than one as
higher education builds on the outcome of basic education.
Parents have also the possibility of complementing public basic education
with private tutoring, e, in order for the o¤spring to attain the threshold level
7All universities are equal as I abstract from quality considerations.
8See for instance Gloom and Ravikumar (1992, 2003) or de la Croix and Doepke (2004). In
what refers to the utility function, including the human capital of the o¤spring is equivalent
to assuming that parents value the wealth they pass to their children. On this, see footnote
2 in Gloom and Ravikumar (1992).
9Considering diminishing returns to ability would not change the results of the model.
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bh that determines the possibility of attending University. The level of human
capital attained by combining basic education with private tutoring (he) is given
by,
he+1 = (1 + "e) zh
 = (1 + "e)hB+1 (4)
where " is a productivity parameter for private tutoring. As is the case with
higher education, tutoring builds on the outcome of basic education. This for-
mulation implies that for any e > 0 we obtain he > hB :
I assume that the only role of tutoring is to allow the access to the University
but that it does not change the return to education once the student sits in
University classes.10 Thus, when the agent incurs this expenditure he chooses
the exact amount that allows the attainment of the threshold, he = bh. So, from
(2) and (4), tutoring is given by:
e =
bh  hB+1
"hB+1
=
bh  zh
"zh
(5)
According to (5) the cost of the necessary private tutoring decreases with
the student ability and with the parent human capital. If these are too low it
becomes too expensive to pay for the private tutoring.
Thus, after all the decisions related to education, the o¤springs human
capital will be,
h+1 =

hB+1 = zh
 if the o¤spring does not go into University
hU+1 = zh
 if the o¤spring goes into University
(6)
Note that choices about the level of education are discrete, a student may
do only basic school or she may go on to University, but if going to University
she graduates.11 Also, quality choices are not considered, all basic education is
equal, all higher education is equal.
To study the agents choices I now look at the costs of higher education.
The following sections consider pure public, pure private and mixed funding of
higher education and compare the results in what refers to access and welfare.
3 Funding and Access to higher education
I begin this section by characterizing separately the di¤erent funding systems,
then I compare these systems in terms of the access to higher education.
10Tutoring could always increase the child nal human capital or, alternatively increase
the nal human capital of all students who go into the University. In any case, the model
qualitative results would not change as the important point is that there are always some
agents who make an extra investment as a means to gain access to the University.
11Galor and Zeira (1993) have shown that the characteristic of indivisibility of human capital
investment in the presence of credit market imperfections implies that the initial distribution
of wealth a¤ects aggregate output and investment in the short and the long run. In this paper
there are implicit credit market imperfections as agents may only spend current income.
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3.1 Pure public funding
When there is pure public funding, higher education is free for private agents
and is paid by the government with the revenues of a proportional income tax
at rate  . Thus, in this case the budget constraint of any given agent is:
c = (1  )(h  e) (7)
where education expenditures are taken to be tax deductible.12 All the decisions
are taken by parents. Students accumulate human capital according to parents
decisions. Parents maximize utility (1) subject to (7) and the education tech-
nology dened by (6), the threshold bh and the possibility of private tutoring as
described by (5). Agents take  as given.13
There are three types of solutions. In the rst one, which I label U , the
student is able to go to the University without the need of private tutoring. A
second type of solution, which I label UT , happens when after basic education
the student does not attain the threshold bh but the parent pays private tutoring
in order for the student to advance to University. Finally, the last type of solu-
tion, which I label B, happens when the student does not go to the University,
so her nal level of human capital is the one that results from basic educa-
tion. When possible, U is the best solution. In this case it is always optimal
to send the student to the University, as there are no additional costs.14 When
U is not possible, which solution - UT or B - maximizes utility depends on the
characteristics of the agent, namely income and students ability.
The next table characterizes the three types of solutions, where the subscript
G stands for a solution in the context of pure public funding.
Table 1: solutions with pure public funding of higher education
UG UTG BG
c (1  )h (1  ) (h  e) (1  )h
h+1 h
U
+1 = h
B
+1 h
U
+1 = h
B
+1 h
B
+1 = zh

Any parent may be characterized by a value for his income, h; and a value
for his o¤spring ability, z. Thus, we may dene in the space (h; z) regions where
the corresponding agents have optimal solutions of types U , UT or B.
If hB+1  bh, that is, if after basic education the minimum threshold bh is
attained, then, U is possible. In this case, U is always the optimal choice. From
(2) this implies that an agent sends his o¤spring to the University without
paying any private tutoring if:
z 
bh
h
(8)
12Note that the agent is not able to use the returns to investment on education as these
belong to the o¤spring. So, there are implicit credit market imperfections in the model.
13 In equilibrium  must be such that tax revenues are equal to expenditure on higher
education. I will come back to this point below.
14There might be opportunity costs if the student could be working instead of studying. I
do not consider these opportunity costs. Maintenance costs may be included in the tuition,
as long as they are independent of income and ability.
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For those agents who dont satisfy the above condition the choice is between
solutions UT and B: The agent chooses to pay for private tutoring if utility for
solution UT is higher than utility for solution B. Taking into account the utility
function (1) and the values for consumption and human capital as described in
Table 1, we obtain that:
u(UTG) > u(BG)() (h  e) =h >   (9)
Substituting with the value of tutoring as determined in (5), we obtain that the
agent pays private tutoring, e > 0; and sends the o¤spring to University if (8)
is not veried and:
z >
bh
h

"
   1

h+ 1
 1
(10)
Below this line agents dont send their o¤spring to the University. As the
second term in the right side of (10) is a positive number smaller than one, this
curve is always below the curve dened in (8). Figure 1 shows the regions that
correspond to each type of solution.
h
z
UG
BG
UTG
(10)
(8)
Figure 1: Agentschoices under pure public funding
UG refers to agents who send their o¤spring to the University without tutoring,
UTG refers to those who pay for tutoring and BG refers to agents who dont send
their o¤spring to the University.
3.2 Mixed and pure private funding
In the case of mixed funding the tuition covers part of the University cost, the
remaining being supported by the public budget. In the case of pure private
funding the tuition covers the whole University cost. All universities have the
same cost x and imply the same return to education as dened in (3). So, I
abstract from considerations related to the choice of quality in higher education.
Let  be the percentage of total University costs that is supported by the tuition,
so that an agent that sends his o¤spring to the University pays xt:15
15 If maintenance costs are included in the xed University cost, x, then pure public funding
includes grants that cover these maintenance costs and the case of no grants but zero tuition
corresponds to a mixed funding case, with positive .
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The next table characterizes the three types of solutions, where the subscript
M stands for a solution in the context of mixed (private and public) funding.
Table 2: solutions with mixed funding of higher education
UM UTM BM
c (1  ) (h  x) (1  ) (h  e  x) (1  )h
h+1 h
U
+1 = h
B
+1 h
U
+1 = Uh
B
+1 h
B
+1
where  is the tax rate needed to pay the part of University costs supported
by the public budget, as dened below.
Denition 1 Let  = f () be the level of the tax rate for a mixed funding
system characterized by ; that guarantees that in equilibrium tax revenues are
equal to public expenditure on higher education. @f=@ < 0; f (1) = 0; f (0) =  :
The subscript  emphasizes the fact that the size of the tax rate depends on
: To be able to fully characterize the function f () I would need to describe the
distribution of h and z, as these characteristics determine which agents continue
to higher education and so, determine the total amount of higher education
costs. However, it is always the case that the larger the , the lower the tax
rate, as the percentage of total costs supported by public funds decrease and
it will be shown that when  increases less students go to higher education
decreasing total costs with higher education. This property is enough to derive
all the results presented below. Notice that for  = 0 we are back in the case of
pure public funding of higher education, described in Table 1. For pure private
funding  = 1 and  = 0; as in this case there is no need for public revenues to
fund higher education.
I solve for the mixed funding of higher education and then the solution
for private funding is obtained considering  = 1 (and  = 0). For both pure
private funding and mixed funding of higher education, the comparison between
solutions of types U and B implies that for agents who attain the threshold bh,
there is still a decision to be taken. These agents dont need to pay private
tutoring but they must decide if they want to pay the tuition.
Taking into account the utility function (1) and the values for consumption
and human capital for solutions U and B, as described in Table 2, we obtain
that an agent who veries condition (8) decides to pay the tuition if:
u(UM ) > u(BM )() (h  x) =h >   (11)
Which implies that,
h >
x
   1 (12)
Thus, for those agents who are able to send their o¤spring to the University
without paying tutoring, the decision of sending or not their o¤spring to the
University only depends on income, not on their ability.16 Only those agents
16This is the result of assuming a xed University cost xt and also a log utility combined
with a Cobb-Douglas production function for h, as discussed by Gloom and Ravikumar (2003).
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with high enough income nd it optimal to pay the tuition. For lower values of
h the optimal solution is of type B.
For those agents whose o¤spring do not attain bh the decision is to pay e and
xt or not send their o¤spring to the University. As tutoring costs depend on
the students ability, z, for these agents the decision depends on both h and z.
For (h; z) below the line dened in (8), the agent compares solutions UT and
B. Taking into account the utility function (1) and the values for consumption
and human capital for these solutions as described in Table 2, we obtain that,
u(UTM ) > u(BM )() (h  x  e) =h >   (13)
Substituting with the value of e given in (5), this implies that the agent pays
private tutoring, e > 0; and sends the o¤spring to University if (8) is not veried
and :
z >
bh
h

"
   1

h+ 1  "x
 1
(14)
Below this line the optimal solution is B; the student does not advance to higher
education.
Figure 2 combines the results obtained in conditions (12) and (14) and shows
the regions that correspond to each type of solution for the mixed funding case.
Notice that the curve dened in condition (14) crosses the line that determines
the possibility of going to the University without tutoring, dened in (8), for
h = x= (   1), the threshold level obtained in (12). Thus, the lines dened
in (12) and (14) cross the curve dened in (8) at the same point. When 
decreases the vertical line moves to the left and the curve that separates UT
from B goes down. Thus, as  decreases, decreasing the private contribution to
University costs, access to higher education increases.
Clearly the number of agents who go to University is maximized for  = 0;
the case of pure public funding. Also, even if there are no private costs attached
to higher education, there is a set of agents who dont advance into it. Moreover,
the poorer a family is, the more likely it is that this happens. This is in line with
empirical observations, namely with the conclusions of Carneiro and Heckman
(2002) and Cardak and Ryan (2009) that the main justication for the income
gap in the access to higher education is not short-run nancial constraints but
must lie on earlier educational achievements. When higher education is free, the
justication for the income gap on access is related to the minimum threshold,bh. This shows how relevant it is to take into account the fact that only those
who attain this minimum threshold are able to advance to higher education.
The reason why the likelyhood of not attending higher education is higher for
the poorer is that the level of human capital of the student depends on her
parents level of human capital which determines income. In the model human
capital totally determines income, in the data income is highly correlated with
education.
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h
z
UM
BM UTM
(8)
(12)
(14)
φ
φ
Figure 2: Agentschoices under mixed or pure private funding
U refers to agents who send their o¤spring to the University without tutoring, UT
to those who pay tutoring and B to those who dont send their o¤spring to the
University. If  decreases; the vertical line moves to the left and curve (14) goes
down and to the left.
Note also that the curve that determines who is willing to pay tutoring in
this case, given in (14), is - for any  > 0 - above the curve that determines who
is willing to pay tutoring in the case of pure public funding of higher education,
given in (10). This implies that when agents also have to pay the tuition they
are less willing to pay tutoring and so, the set of agents who chooses to pay
tutoring is smaller in this case. Moreover, the larger the tuition (larger ), the
smaller is the set of agents who chooses to to pay for tutoring.
3.3 Access to higher education for di¤erent values of 
Proposition 3 looks at agentsdecisions under each funding system and char-
acterizes the set of agents who never send their o¤spring into University, those
that always do and those for whom the decision depends on the value of :
Proposition 2 i) Those agents characterized by a pair (h; z) such that
z <
bh
h

"
   1

h+ 1
 1
dont send their o¤spring to the University in either funding system.
ii) Those agents characterized by a pair (h; z) such that
h >
x
   1 \ z >
bh
h

"
   1

h+ 1  "x
 1
send their o¤spring to the University in any funding system.
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iii) For all the other agents the decision depends on the value of : For any ,
such that 0    1; those agents characterized by a pair (h; z) such that
the conditions in i) and ii) are not veried and,
h >
x
   1 [ z >
bh
h

"
   1

h+ 1  "x
 1
send their o¤spring to University.
Proof. The inequality in part i) of the Proposition is the same condition
as in equation (10) but with the opposite sign and separates the sets UTG and
BG in Figure 1. For  = 0, this is the condition that determines which agents
dont send their o¤spring to the University. For  > 0; the relevant conditions
are (14) and (12). As the set determined by these two conditions is above (10),
for any  > 0, those pairs (h; z) that are below the line dened in (10) are also
below the line dened by (14) and (12), shown in Figure 2. Thus, below this
line agents dont send their o¤spring to the University in either system. This
proves part i) of the Proposition.
In part ii) of the Proposition, the rst inequality is given in (12) for  = 1
and the second in (14), also for  = 1. As seen above (12) results from imposing
u(UM ) > u(BM ), for agents who satisfy (8), and (14) results from imposing
u(UTM ) > u(BM ); for agents who dont satisfy (8). If a pair (h; z) is above
these lines for  = 1 it also above these lines for any  < 1. Thus, if the agent
is in the region above (14) and to the right of (12) he sends his o¤spring to the
University for  = 1 and also for any  < 1.
For  = 0, condition (10) determines which agents send their o¤spring to
the University. The line dened by (10) is below the line dened by (14), for
any  > 0. This proves part ii) of the Proposition.
Part iii) of the Proposition considers the pairs (h; z) that dont satisfy the
condition in part i) nor the conditions in part ii). The rst inequality is given
in (12) and results from imposing u(UM ) > u(BM ); for agents who satisfy (8),
and the second inequality is given in condition (14) and results from imposing
u(UTM ) > u(BM ), for agents who dont satisfy condition (8).
Figure 3 identies the regions characterized above. Regions A (A1 and A2)
correspond to the set dened in Proposition 2, part iii), that is, correspond
to those agents for whom the decision of sending their o¤spring to University
depends on the value of . These agents send their o¤spring to University if
there is pure public funding of higher education but not if there is pure private
funding. A1 corresponds to those agents who dont need to pay private tutoring
and region A2 to those that do.
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h
z
U1
B
A1
A2
(10)φ=0
U2
(8)
(12φ=1)
Figure 3: Access to higher education for di¤erent funding systems
Regions A1 and A2 refer to agents for whom the decision of sending their o¤spring
to University depend on . Region B refers to agents who never send their o¤spring
to University and regions U1 and U2 refer to agents who always do.
As shown in Figure 2, access to the University increases when  decreases.
Thus, a government that wants to maximize access should choose  = 0: But,
as we saw this would not close the gap between rich and poor in the access
to higher education, which is line with the empirical results of Carneiro and
Heckman (2003) who defend that to reduce this gap countries need to invest in
basic education.
This analysis emphasizes that only for a set of median agents - in terms of
ability and income - does the decision of sending their o¤spring to higher edu-
cation depend on the existence and depth of public funding of higher education.
For the extremes of the population the value of  does not change this decision.
However, even for those agents who gain access to University this does not
imply that their welfare is higher under public funding of higher education as
there are also costs associated with this funding system to be considered: taxes
and, for those agents who need it, private tutoring. So, now I compare the level
of utility under each funding system for each type of agent.
4 Welfare: who gains, who loses?
This section answers the question asked in the title of the paper, using the
framework developed in the previous sections and beginning with the set of
agents for whom access to higher education depends on the funding system.
First, for each value of , I look at the welfare of the marginal agent, where
marginal refers to access, as dened below. Then, I extend the analysis to
all agents whose decision depends on the value of . Finally, I look at the
agents in the extremes of the distribution. Proposition 8 summarizes the results:
it characterizes the set of agents who have higher welfare under pure private
funding than under a mixed system dened by a given value of .
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Denition 3 For any   0, marginal agents are those who are indi¤erent
between sending or not sending their o¤spring to higher education.
Lemma 4 looks at the welfare of the marginal agents for a given level of 
and compares welfare for that level of , and for pure private funding, ( = 1):
Lemma 4 For any value of , e, such that 1 > e  0, the marginal agents
have higher welfare under pure private funding of higher education,  = 1; than
with a system of mixed funding characterized by  = e.
Proof.
i) For the marginal agents who satisfy condition (8), solutions of types U
and B give the same utility and thus condition (12) is veried in equality.
Thus, for those agents,
u(UM ; = e) = u(BM ; = e)()
() ln(1  e)

h  ex+  ln hB+1 = ln(1  e)h+  lnhB+1
And, for any  > 0; it must be that,
ln(1  e)h+  lnhB+1 < lnh+  lnhB+1 () u(BM ) < u(BR)
where the subscript R refers to the solution in the context of pure private
funding. Substituting with the previous condition we obtain that,
u(UM ) < u(BR)
Thus, for these agents it is better not to go to the University and not to
pay taxes; they have higher welfare for  = 1:
ii) For the marginal agents who dont satisfy condition (8), solutions of types
UT and B give the same utility and thus condition (14) is veried in
equality. Thus, for those agents,
u(UTM ; = e) = u(BM ; = e)()
() ln(1  e)

h  e  ex+  ln hB+1 = ln(1  e)h+  lnhB+1
And, for any  > 0; it must be that,
ln(1  e)h+  lnhBt+1 < lnh+  lnhB+1 () u(BM ) < u(BR)
Substituting with the previous condition we obtain that,
u(UTM ) < u(BR)
Thus, for these agents it is better not to go to the University and not to
pay taxes nor tutoring; they have higher welfare for  = 1:
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Consider those agents who would not go into University if the tuition was
marginally higher. These are also agents for whom the utility from going into
University is just marginally higher than the utility of not going. Thus, once
they are obliged to pay taxes, it is their best choice to pay the remaining cost
of higher education x , or x+ e, and advance to University. However, if they
could choose, they would always prefer not to go to University and not to pay
taxes and tuition.
I now extend the result of the previous Lemma to a neighborhood of the set
of marginal agents.
Proposition 5 For  = e; such that 1 > e  0, consider the set of agents who
send their o¤spring to higher education for  = e but not for  = 1, that is
these agents characterized by a pair (h; z) such that,
h >
ex
   1 \ z >
bh
h

"
   1

h+ 1  "ex 1 \ (15)
\
 
h <
x
   1 [ z <
bh
h

"
   1

h+ 1  "x
 1!
Let e < (   1) =.17 There is a non-empty subset of this set of agents
characterized by,8><>: h <
ex
 1=(1  e) [ z <
bh
h

"
 1=(1  e)
 h+ 1  "ex 1 for e > 0
z <
bht
h
h
"
 1=(1 )
 h+ 1
i 1
for e = 0 (16)
who have higher welfare for  = 1 than for e.
Proof.
i) Consider rst those agents who satisfy conditions (15) and (8): these
agents choose the solution of type U for  = e and the solution of type B
under pure private funding. Thus, for these agents to have higher welfare
for  = 1 than for e, it must be that,
u(BR) > u(UM ; = e)
Taking into account the solutions described in Table 2, this implies that
ln (h) +  lnhB+1 > ln(1  e)

h  ex+  ln hB+1
which implies the rst inequality in condition (16), for e > 0. For e = 0,
none of these agents have higher utility for  = 1 than for e:
17 If this condition is not veried no student goes into higher education, as the productivity
of higher education, as measured by , is too low.
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ii) Consider now those agents who satisfy condition (15) but dont satisfy
condition (8): these agents choose the solution of type UT for  = e and
the solution of type B under pure private funding. Thus, for these agents
to have higher welfare for  = 1 than for e, it must be that,
u(BR) > u(UTM ; = e)
Taking into account the solutions described in Table 2, this implies that
ln (h) +  lnhB+1 > ln(1  e)

h  e  ex+  ln hB+1
Next, take into account the value of e as determined in (5) and obtain,
h > (1  e)
 
h 
bh
"zh
+ 1  ex!
which, after some calculations, implies the second inequality in condition
(16).
iii) To see that this set is non-empty compare the expressions in the right side
of both inequalities in (16) with the corresponding expressions in the rst
line of (15). The curve dened in (16) is above the line dened by the rst
two inequalities in (15), for any  > 0 and e > 0. For e = 0, the condition
in (16) is above the corresponding expression in the rst line of (15), for
any  > 0:
Moving from a pure private funding system to a mixed funding system al-
ways implies that there is a non-empty set of agents who gain access to higher
education but whose welfare decreases. If everyone pays to fund higher educa-
tion through income taxes, there are always some people for whom the increase
in (their o¤spring) income obtained from going to the University is not enough
to compensate their current consumption loss implied by taxes. For these peo-
ple no taxes and no higher education would imply higher welfare. This is more
probably the case for those agents who benet less from going to University
because of lower ability and/or lower parentshuman capital. Figure 4 shows
the set of agents who gain access to the University when the economy changes
from a pure private funding system to a public funding system but that however,
see their welfare decreased. Note that the lines dened by conditions (14) and
(16) intersect for h = x(1   ) (1  ) = ; but both curves are always above
condition (10) that denes the set of agents who never go to University.
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U1
B
A1
A2
(8)
(10)φ=0
(12φ=1)
(14φ=1)
U2
(16)
h
z
(8)
(12φ=1)
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(16)
(12φ<1)
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Figure 4: Agents who gain access to higher education but lose in welfare terms.
The shaded areas refer to agents who gain access but whose welfare decreases. The
left panel compares  = 1 and  = 0. The right one compares  = 1 and 0 < e < 1:
Next, I look at welfare for the extremes of the distribution. The following
Lemma looks at those agents who never send their o¤spring to the University
whatever the funding system - region B in Figure 3.
Lemma 6 Those agents characterized in part i) of Proposition 2 dont send
their o¤spring to the University in either funding system. All these agents have
the highest welfare in the pure private funding system and their welfare decreases
when  increases.
Proof. Compare solutions of type B in Tables 1 and 2 and note that 
increases when  decreases.
For those agents who dont send their o¤spring to University in any case,
welfare is clearly higher under pure private funding of higher education. This
happens because with public funding they have to pay taxes although they never
use the higher education system. So, their preferred value of  is 1. This is just a
consequence of the fact, already recognized in the literature, that public funding
of higher education implies a redistribution from those that dont attend higher
education to those that do. As students from high income families are more
likely to attend higher education, this implies a redistribution of income from
poor to rich people,
The next Lemma considers those agents who send their o¤spring to Univer-
sity in any funding system - regions U1 and U2 in Figure 3 - and compares welfare
for pure private funding ( = 1) and a mixed funding system characterized by
 = e.
Lemma 7 Those agents characterized in part ii) of Proposition 2 send their
o¤spring to the University for any value of . These agents have higher welfare
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with  = 1 than with  = e; such that 1 > e  0 if,
h >
x
e
h
1  e(1  e)i \ z >
" bh
h
#"
"h+ 1  "x
e
h
1  e(1  e)i
# 1
(17)
Proof.
i) Consider rst those agents characterized in part ii) of Proposition 2 who
satisfy condition (8): these agents choose the solution of type U for any
. Thus, for these agents to have higher welfare for  = 1 than for e, it
must be that,
u(UR) > u(UM ; = e)
Taking into account the solutions described in Table 2, this implies that
ln (h  x) +  lnhU+1 > ln(1  e)

h  ex+  lnhU+1
which implies the rst inequality in condition (17).
ii) Consider now those agents who dont satisfy condition (8): these agents
choose the solution of type UT for any . Thus, for these agents to have
higher welfare for  = 1 than for e, it must be that,
u(UTR) > u(UTM ; = e)
Taking into account the solutions described in Table 2, this implies that
ln (h  x) +  lnhU+1 > ln(1  e)

h  e  ex+  lnhU+1
Next, take into account the value of e as determined in (5) and obtain,
after some calculations, the second inequality in condition (17).
For those agents who always send their o¤spring to the University without
the need to pay tutoring welfare may be higher under pure private funding than
under a partial public funding of higher education depending on their level of
income. This happens because with public funding (partial or total) they have
to pay taxes, which are proportional to income, but they only pay part of the
xed University tuition while under private funding the opposite happens. As
taxes are proportional to income, the richer pay more taxes and if they are rich
enough they prefer to pay the tuition. So, the richer they are, the more likely
they are to prefer pure private funding.
Those agents who always send their o¤spring to University but that need
to pay private tutoring spend the same amount with tutoring in both funding
systems. However, as I consider these expenditures to be tax deductible this
must be taken into account when comparing taxes and University tuition. Tax
deductions are higher for those agents whose o¤spring are further away from
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the threshold value, bh. Thus, for those agents who pay private tutoring, the
higher their level of human capital, and the higher the ability of their o¤spring,
the more they prefer private funding because, as they spend a smaller amount
in private tutoring, their tax deductions are also smaller.
Proposition 8 summarizes the results of the previous Lemmas and Proposi-
tion 5.
Proposition 8 Let  < (   1) =. Those agents characterized by a pair
(h; z) such that, 
h >
x

h
1  e(1  )i \ z > bh
h

"h+ 1  "x

h
1  e(1  )i 1! [8><>: ht <
ex
 1=(1  e) [ z <
bh
h

"
 1=(1  e)
 h+ 1  "ex 1 for e > 0
z <
bht
h
h
"
 1=(1 )
 h+ 1
i 1
for e = 0
have higher welfare for  = 1 than for  = e.
Proof. The conditions in the rst line were obtained in Lemma 7, the
conditions in the second line were obtained in Proposition 5. From Lemma 6
we know that all agents characterized by pairs (h; z) that are below the line
determined in condition (10) have higher welfare for  = 1. Any pair (h; z)
that veries the conditions in the second line is also below the line dened in
condition (10). Thus, for all these agents welfare is higher for  = 1 than for
 = e.
Figure 5 shows the set of agents who have higher welfare under pure private
funding than under pure public funding, as implied by the previous Proposition,
for e = 0. Note that, for  = 0, the lines dened by conditions (14), (17) and
(16) intersect for h = x (1  ) = ; but the three curves are always above
condition (10) that denes the set of agents who never go to University.
From the analysis until now, I conclude that although a change from a pure
private funding system to a pure public funding system, or more generally to a
mixed funding system, always implies an increase in access to higher education,
the richer and the poorer prefer private funding and the middle income agents
prefer public funding. Moreover, we can not identify gaining access to University
with an increase in welfare. This happens because on one hand, access to higher
education increases welfare but on the other hand the fact there is public funding
of higher education implies that all agents have to pay higher taxes, which
decreases welfare. For the agents identied in Proposition 5 the last e¤ect is
stronger than the rst one.
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(10)
(17)
Figure 5: higher welfare with private than with public funding
The shaded area corresponds to agents who have higher welfare with pure private
funding than with pure public funding. The white area in the middle corresponds to
agents who prefer pure public funding.
A new and important result is that among those who gain access to the Uni-
versity with public funding the poorer among them prefer pure private funding.
Thus, when we compare public funding with pure private funding, once we take
into account the possibility of complementing public funding of basic education
with private tutoring, there is always a set of agents among those who gain
access to the University that would have higher welfare without going to the
University and without paying taxes and private tutoring. Note that paying
private tutoring is an optimal choice for these agents only because they have to
pay taxes to fund higher education anyway.
5 A Di¤erent Funding System: higher educa-
tion tax
Lemma 4 states that with public funding - even partial public funding - of
higher education, the marginal agent to access higher education would have
higher welfare with a pure private funding system. He would prefer not to send
his o¤spring to University and not to pay taxes. Lemma 6 states that all those
who dont send their o¤spring to higher education in any system prefer pure
private funding as when there is public funding of higher education they pay
for the higher education of the others. To avoid these problems I now consider
a funding system for higher education where agents only contribute for higher
education funding if they send their o¤spring to University. So, agents may
choose if they want to be part of the higher education (funding) system. I
consider a mixed system similar to the previous one, where  measures the
private contribution for higher education costs but where only those who send
their o¤spring to University pay the taxes that nance higher education.18 This
18All taxes are used to fund higher education, I abstract from other uses of public revenues.
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is a higher education tax as it is only paid by those who use the higher
education system. This also approximates a system where tuition is xed but
there are simultaneously grants that depend on income on such a way that the
nal amount paid by each agent for higher education depends positively on the
householdsincome.19
In this environment there are the same three types of solutions: U when
the student goes into University without the need of private tutoring, UT when
the student goes to University but for that needs to pay private tutoring and B
when the student doesnt go to University. The next table characterizes these
solutions, where the subscript O stands for a solution in this context where the
agent may opt for University and paying taxes or not going to University and
not paying taxes. O is the tax rate associated to a private contribution x in
this funding system.
Table 3: solutions with a higher educationtax
UO UTO BO
c (1  O ) (h  x) (1  O ) (h  e  x) h
h+1 h
U
+1 = h
B
+1 h
U
+1 = h
B
+1 h
B
+1
In this context, if condition (8) is satised, that is, if the agent doesnt need
to pay private tutoring, the agent chooses between solutions U and B. The
choice is not obvious even if  = 0, as he only pays taxes if his o¤spring goes to
University. Comparing UO and BO, we obtain that agents for whom condition
(8) is veried send their o¤spring to University if:
u(UO) > u(BO)() h > x 

   1=(1  O )
(18)
where I assume that O < (
   1) =.20
For those agents for whom condition (8) is not satised, that is, for those
agents who need to pay private tutoring, we compare solutions UTO and BO.
Taking into account the value of tutoring as dened in (5) we obtain that these
agents send their o¤spring to University if,
u(UTO) > u(BO)() z >
bh
h

"
   1=(1  O )

h+ 1  "x
 1
(19)
Figure 6 shows the regions that correspond to each type of solution:21 Con-
dition (19) denes a line that crosses (8) at the level of h dened in (18).
19This funding system could also approximate, in the context of this paper, the income-
contingent student loans recently introduced in UK, and with variants, already implement
for some years in Australia, New Zealand and Sweden among other countries. However, here
taxes are paid by parents while their children are at University.
20Again, if O > (
   1) = no agent goes to University.
21Here it is not clear what happens to access when  changes, as change on O has opposite
e¤ects on access. See conditions (18) and (19).
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Figure 6: Agentschoices under a higher education tax
Uo refers to agents who send their o¤spring to the University without tutoring, UT o
refers to agents who pay for tutoring and Bo refers to agents who dont send their
o¤spring to the University.
The following Proposition compares access to higher education for a given
value of the tuition, determined by , when public expenditures are nanced
with a higher education tax or by an income tax applied to the whole population
as described in the previous sections.
Proposition 9 For any  = e, such that 1 > e  0, for the same value ofe, there are more students continuing to higher education when all taxpayers
contribute to the funding system than when only those with o¤spring in higher
education contribute to the funding system.
Proof. For  = 0; condition (19) is always above condition (10). For
0 <  < 1; condition (19) is always above condition (14) and condition (18) is
always to the right of condition (13).
As we would expect, if going to University implies paying taxes, access to
higher education is lower for the same value of tuition, for  < 1, than in the
system where all agents contribute through taxes to the public funding of higher
education. This is shown in Figure 7. For  = 1; there is pure private funding
exactly as before: no taxes and those agents who send their o¤spring to higher
education pay the whole cost x. Thus, for  = 1, all the results are exactly as
in Sections 3 and 4.
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Figure 7: Access to higher education under a higher education tax and with a
generic income tax
The shaded area corresponds to agents who send their o¤spring to University when
all taxpayers contribute to the public funding of higher education but not when only
those who benet from the system contribute to it, considering the same value for :
Panel (a) is for  = 0; panel (b) is for 0 <  < 1.
The following Proposition looks at the welfare of those agents for whom
access to higher education depends on the value of , for the case of a higher
education tax.
Proposition 10 If taxes are paid only by those agents who send their o¤spring
to higher education, then, for any  = e, such that 1 > e  0, all those agents
who send their o¤spring to higher education for  = e but not for  = 1 have
higher welfare for  = e than for  = 1:
Proof.
i) Consider rst those agents who satisfy condition (8): if send their o¤spring
to higher education for  = e but not for  = 1, then they choose the
solution of type U for  = e and the solution of type B under pure private
funding. Thus, for these agents, it must be that,
u(BR) > u(UR) and u(UO; = e) > u(BO; = e)
From Table 2, solutions BR and BO coincide. Thus u(BO; = e) =
u(BR): So, we obtain that u(UO; = e) > u(BR), implying that these
agents have higher welfare for  = e than for  = 1:
ii) Consider now those agents who dont satisfy condition (8): these agents
choose the solution of type UT for  = e and the solution of type B under
pure private funding. Thus, it must be that, for these agents,
u(BR) > u(UTR) and u(UTO; = e) > u(BO; = e)
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We saw that u(BO; = e) = u(BR): Thus, u(UTO; = e) > u(BR),
implying that these agents have higher welfare for  = e than for  = 1:
The main advantage of having taxes paid only by those agents who send
their o¤spring to higher education is that with this system there is no longer
a redistribution of income from the poorer to the richer. Moreover, in this
case, welfare increases for all those agents who gain access to higher education
depends on public funding..
6 Conclusion
This paper studies the e¤ect of public funding of higher education on the welfare
of di¤erent agents, focusing on those agents whose decision of sending or not
their children to the University depends on public funding policy. The model
considers that all decisions are made by parents and takes into account the
hierarchical nature of the educational system and also the fact that parents
always have the possibility to complement basic public education with private
expenditures in individual tutoring.
Assuming that public expenditure on higher education is nanced through a
proportional income tax applied to the whole adult population, I consider three
funding systems for higher education: pure public funding, pure private funding
and a mixed funding system, where only a percentage  of the higher education
cost is privately supported with the remaining being publicly supported. I
obtain that although pure public funding maximizes access to University, moving
from pure private funding, to pure public funding or to a mixed funding system,
always decreases the welfare of the poorer agents. Moreover, I show that, for
any value of , the welfare of the marginal agents to access University is always
lower than under a pure private funding system. This happens because in the
pure private funding system these parents would not send their o¤spring to
University but they would also not pay the tuition nor taxes. Thus, when
studying the welfare e¤ects of public funding for higher education, we can not
identify gaining access to University with an increase in welfare. The equality
of opportunity in access to higher education is the main argument in favor of
public funding of higher education. However, it is shown that if all taxpayers
contribute to the public funding of higher education then the system is harming
those agents who it was supposed to help.
Finally, I consider nancing higher education through a higher education tax,
meaning that only those who send their children to University contribute to the
public funding of higher education. With this funding system, although access
decreases relative to the case where all agents contribute to the system, it is
shown that all agents who gain access to higher education due to public funding
have higher welfare under public funding than with pure private funding. In
this case, all income redistribution happens in the right direction and the system
increases the welfare of those agents it is supposed to help.
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I did not consider the e¤ects of current policy on future human capital and
aggregate productivity. This would be an interesting extension. However, for
the current generation I believe that the analysis in this paper is the most
relevant one. Note that, in this paper, the utility of agents already increases
with the education of their children, so it is already considered some degree of
intergenerational altruism.
Also, I did not consider any specic distribution of human capital and ability.
This implies that the results obtained are valid for any possible distribution of
human capital and ability and thus, for any economy.
An important policy implication that results from the analysis in this paper is
that funding higher education with a generic tax income that applies to everyone
in the economy, including people that dont use the higher education system
reduces welfare for those people and also for those that gain access to higher
education but for whom the benet in terms of income change is small. And
these tend to be the students with poor earlier educational achievements.
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